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INTRODUCTION
Courts engage in judicial activism when they interpret laws
without regards to a canon of construction. Black’s Law Dictionary de-
fines judicial activism as a “philosophy of judicial decision-making
whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy, among
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other factors, to guide their decisions.”1 When courts engage in judicial
activism they are not performing legal analysis but rather make law
which is the function of the Legislative Branch. This is because courts
are not interpreting what the law is, but instead state what they feel
the law should be, which defeats the purpose of and usurps the power
of lawmakers.
The Second Circuit,2 the Ninth Circuit,3 and several Federal
District Courts4 have engaged in judicial activism when they held that
whistleblowers are entitled to retaliation remedies under the Dodd-
Frank Act (DFA) when the wrongdoing is not reported to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) by claiming that the plain and un-
ambiguous statutory language, specifically a clearly defined term, is
ambiguous, and proceeded to promote their views on how the statute
should be written. The DFA clearly articulates that the wrongdoing
must be reported “to the Commission,”5 yet these courts have somehow
interpreted this to be ambiguous.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Berman acknowledged that the
DFA anti-retaliation whistleblower statute is plain on its face but held
that such an interpretation renders the statute ambiguous when it pro-
claimed that a “ ‘mechanical use of a statutory definition’ is not always
warranted.”6 The court did not fully articulate how the statute is am-
biguous. The dissenting opinion notes that the majority opinion uses
circular reasoning in its analysis by claiming that by using a mechani-
cal use the statue is ambiguous.7 A “mechanical use” does not
1. Judicial Activism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
2. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
3. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017).
4. See, e.g., Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y.
2014); see also Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDWQ)(MCA), 2014
WL 940703, at *3-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014); Arshad v. Tortoise Capital Advisors, LLC, No.
13-2267-KHV, 2014 WL 707235, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Feb. 24, 2014); Ahmad v. Morgan Stanley
& Co., 2 F. Supp. 3d 491, 495-97 n.5 (S.D.N.Y 2014); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.)
LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 146-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, No. 12-5914
(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F.
Supp. 2d 42, 44-46 (D. Mass. 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106-07 (D.
Colo. 2013); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (M.D. Tenn.
2012); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *3-4 (D.
Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202, 2011 WL 1672066, at
*4-7 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
5. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6) (West, effective July 22, 2010).
6. Berman, 801 F.3d at 154.
7. Id. at 157 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“The majority assumes its own conclusion,
claiming that ‘subdivision (iii) [of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)] . . . purports to protect employ-
ees from retaliation for making reports required or protected by Sarbanes-Oxley’. Maj. Op.
at 25 (emphasis added). That is a bad misreading, tantamount to a misquotation.”).
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necessarily mean that the statute is ambiguous. Surprisingly, the ma-
jority bluntly admits “[i]f we had to choose between reading the statute
literally or broadly to carry out its apparent purpose, we might well
favor the latter course.”8 The Supreme Court of the United States held
that the instance in which it is apropos to depart from a mechanical
use of a statutory definition throughout a statute is when it would cre-
ate an “obvious incongruity” or frustrate an evident statutory purpose
for a particular provision.9
The Ninth Circuit held that the term “whistleblower” can have
different meanings in different contexts by misapplying the in pari
materia canon of construction, as well as projecting its own interpreta-
tion of legislative and Congressional intent from the text of the statute
instead of the actual legislative history.10 The court first argued that
the term “to the Commission” in DFA anti-retaliation whistleblower
statute can have a different meaning by context,11 but does not articu-
late how the context can otherwise be interpreted through a canon of
construction. The court cites a treatise but fails to provide the full lan-
guage of the treatise, which explains that when a word that defined is
not clear, the meaning of the definition is almost always the ordinary
meaning of the word.12 Furthermore, the court explained that the leg-
islative history suggests a broad interpretation of “to the Commission”
but not by the legislative history itself, but rather by the language of
the statute.13 This is a statutory interpretation argument masked
under a legislative argument in an attempt to obfuscate importing its
views on how the statute should have been written.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the Second and Ninth Circuits and held that the plain
language of “to the Commission” in the SEC anti-retaliation whistle-
8. Id. at 155.
9. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979).
10. See Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The case must
be seen against the background of twenty-first century statutes to curb securities abuses.
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, following a major financial scandal. . . . It
also provides protections to these and other ‘whistleblower’ employees in the event that
companies retaliate against them. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). Sarbanes-Oxley expressly protects
those who lawfully provide information to federal agencies, Congress, or ‘a person with su-
pervisory authority over the employee.’ Id.”).
11. Id. at 1049.
12. Id. (“The use of a term in one part of a statute ‘may mean [a] different thing[ ]’ in a
different part, depending on context. (citation omitted). This is true even where, as here, the
statute includes a definitional provision: ‘[Statutory d]efinitions are, after all, just one indi-
cation of meaning — a very strong indication, to be sure, but nonetheless one that can be
contradicted by other indications.’ ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 228 (2012).”).
13. Id. at 1049-50.
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blower statute leaves no doubt as to its meaning.14 In addition to
relying on the plain meaning of the statute, the Court also acknowl-
edged that an in pari materia15 interpretation of the statute and the
purpose of the statute support the position that “to the Commission”
can only mean to the SEC.16
This Article asserts that judicial activism occurs when a court
goes beyond the plain meaning of the text that is plain and unambigu-
ous, to promulgate its politics. This Article does not make the
argument nor infer that this is the sole definition of judicial activism.
Rather, this Article is narrowing the scope by enumerating a specific
act that falls within the category of judicial activism.
This argument proceeds as follows. Part I provides context of
judicial activism. Part II analyzes how various courts have interpreted
the statute, and whether the interpretation is consistent with canons
of construction. Part III assesses ambiguity in statutes. Part IV exam-
ines the legislative history of the statute. Part V identifies public policy
purposes as a reason for why courts have engaged in judicial activism.
Part VI analogizes interpretations of other whistleblower statutes and
whistleblower cases, to illustrate how the DFA whistleblower statutes
should be interpreted. And Part VII makes reductio ad absurdum ar-
guments which emphasize the absurd results of a broad interpretation
of the statute.
I. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. is credited with creating the term “judi-
cial activism.”17 In 1947, Schlesinger wrote an article on the nine
Supreme Court Justices and detailed their differing views on the legis-
lative interpretation and “the proper function of the judiciary in a
14. Dig. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (2018) (“Our charge in this
review proceeding is to determine the meaning of “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h), Dodd-
Frank’s anti-retaliation provision. The definition section of the statute supplies an unequiv-
ocal answer: A “whistleblower” is “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6) (emphasis added). Leaving
no doubt as to the definition’s reach, the statute instructs that the “definitio[n] shall apply”
“[i]n this section,” that is, throughout §78u–6. §78u–6(a)(6).”).
15. Id. at 771 (“This reading is reinforced by another whistleblower protection provi-
sion in Dodd-Frank, see 12 U. S. C. §5567(b), which imposes no requirement that
information be conveyed to a government agency.”).
16. Id. (“The Court’s understanding is corroborated by Dodd-Frank’s purpose and de-
sign. The core objective of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower program is to aid the Commission’s
enforcement efforts by ‘motivat[ing] people who know of securities law violations to tell the
SEC.’ ”).
17. See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 1947, at 202,
208.
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democracy”18 regarding the New Deal. Since then, proponents of judi-
cial activism argue that it is “a way for a Court to live up to its
obligation to serve as citadel of the public justice.”19 While this charac-
terization of judicial activism may purport to uphold justice, morality,
and ethics, it fails to recognize the pragmatic view that judges may
undertake constitutional interpretation based upon what they consider
a favorable result,20 which is often grounded in political ideology. In
the Turpin v. Mailet dissenting opinion, the court explicated:
One need only skim through the all too numerous Supreme Court
dissents to recognize that on occasion judicial activism has been
checked with a very loose rein. Sometimes this has pleased the so-
called conservatives; at other times it has gratified the so-called lib-
erals. During the early decades of the twentieth century, those who
are today’s staunchest supporters of judicial activism were the
most vocal critics of the Supreme Court’s ‘usurpation’ of congres-
sional powers in striking down social and welfare legislation. When
the focus of the judiciary swung from property rights to personal
rights, a new and different set of critics came to the fore. The issue,
as these critics see it, is not one of liberalism versus conservatism,
but one of representative democratic government versus judicial
autocracy.21
Judge Frank Easterbrook blazons, “[e]veryone scorns judicial
‘activism,’ that notoriously slippery term.”22 and further elaborates
that judicial activism is “empty, a mask for a substantive position.”23
Another commentator has held that a jurist may be classified into their
political ideology and their view, and also whether they may be “com-
mitted to the rule of law and principled decision-making.”24
18. Id.
19. Rebecca L. Brown, Activism Is Not a Four-Letter Word, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1257,
1273 (2002).
20. See William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1245–53 (2002); see also Wilson R. Huhn, In Defense of the Roosevelt
Court, 2 FLA. AGRIC. & MECHANICAL U.L. REV. 1, 12-15 (2007) (discussing how Supreme
Court Justices Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, and Robert Jackson em-
ployed different principles of interpretation which led to disagreements over the law,
despite the fact that they each shared a common goal of human rights).
21. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 1978) (judgement vacated by City of
West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978)) (emphasis added).
22. Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?,
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2002).
23. Id.
24. David Boies, Reflections on Bush v. Gore: The Role of the United States Supreme
Court, 1 FLA. AGRIC. & MECHANICAL U.L. REV. 105, 108 (2006) (asserting that jurists can be
classified as a “conservative-liberal” category, a “judicial activism-judicial restraint” cate-
gory: “A liberal judge can be an advocate of judicial activism, such as Earl Warren, or
judicial restraint, such as Felix Frankfurter. The same is true for a conservative judge.”).
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There are over 100 canons of construction, including policy ca-
nons.25 If a judge cannot find one canon of construction to base their
opinion, or are ignoring precedent, or the text of the Constitution, they
are clearly imposing their own views on the court. One scholar who has
denounced the term “judicial activism” as a talking point has, albeit in
a genteel manner, conceded the argument that some judges are not
properly basing their opinions in law but rather their own personal
views.26
“The term ‘judicial activism’ has come under fire in the last two
decades—primarily by politically conservative commentators who de-
cry the methodological legitimacy of judges relying on policy
preferences and contemporary societal norms, in addition to precedent
and the history and text of the Constitution, to inform their opin-
ions.”27 Judges relying on their own views of the law rather than what
the law is are activists. “The costs or risks of such constitutional activ-
ism are substantial, however.”28 Judges that base opinions on their
policy preferences, over the Constitution, create bias and prejudice and
inflict harm on the adversely affected party.
There are three salient methods in which courts execute judicial
activism: (1) rule that a law is unconstitutional; (2) the canon of consti-
tutional doubt (use precedential opinions to find incompatibilities
which create doubt); and (3) misconstrue the statute to claim it should
be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the judge’s personal
policy preference.29 When judges intentionally misconstrue statutes in
order to impose their policy views, they can do so in a number of ways.
One approach is when judges interpret the law in a way that is incon-
sistent with the policy of another provision.30 Another approach, as in
25. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 901, 940 (2013) (“There are more than 100 substantive canons, and they run the
range from transsubstantive policy presumptions (e.g., ambiguous federal statutes will not
be construed to intrude on traditional state functions); to subject-specific rules (e.g., ambig-
uous bankruptcy statutes shall be construed in favor of the debtor); to the dozen or so
presumptions that concern delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies.
These canons are infamously conflicting, overlapping, and manipulable, and have been de-
scribed as everything from ‘judicial lawmaking’ to ‘democracy protective’ to ‘constitutional
law.’”).
26. See generally Sudha Setty, Preferential Judicial Activism, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM.
L. & POL’Y 151 (2015).
27. Id. at 151.
28. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 43 (1994).
29. Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 1404.
30. See, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988).
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the instance of the DFA whistleblower anti-retaliation statute, is when
the courts engage in judicial activism by holding that a statute is am-
biguous or that it is meant to be interpreted broadly.
The Second Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Federal District Courts
that have held that the DFA whistleblower anti-retaliation provision
may be interpreted broadly by asserting that “to the Commission” does
not necessarily imply the SEC. In Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., the
court observed that this broad “interpretation of the [DFA] would read
the phrase ‘to the Commission’ in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) out of the stat-
ute altogether.”31 After acknowledging this, in a perplexing syllogism,
the court then states “[t]he contradictory provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act are best harmonized by reading 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s
protection of certain whistleblower disclosures not requiring reporting
to the SEC as a narrow exception to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)’s definition
of a whistleblower as one who reports to the SEC.”32
The narrow exception that the court talks about is not narrow
at all. The court is expressing the notion that a whistleblower does not
have to report to the SEC, despite the definition of whistleblower say-
ing it does. The DFA defines the term “whistleblower” to mean “any
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who
provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
Commission.”33 Broad interpretations of statutory provisions are al-
lowed if Congress has specifically provided for the broader policy in
more specific language elsewhere.34 The Egan court acknowledged this
and noted that “[t]he absence of similarly broad protections for whistle-
blowers alleging securities law violations indicates that Congress
intended to encourage whistleblowers reporting such violations to re-
port to the SEC.”35 The dissent in Berman, stated that the majority
construed the statute in order to spread abroad its views on how the
statute should have been written rather than on how it is written:
The majority and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
have altered a federal statute by deleting three words (“to the Com-
mission”) from the definition of “whistleblower” in the Dodd-Frank
31. Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (effective July 22, 2010).
34. See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 491 (1994); see also John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1993); W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 92 (1991) superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) (2009), as recog-
nized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
35. Egan, 2011 WL 1672066 at *4.
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Act. No doubt, my colleagues in the majority, assisted by the SEC or
not, could improve many federal statutes by tightening them or
loosening them, or recasting or rewriting them. I could try my hand
at it. But our obligation is to apply congressional statutes as writ-
ten. In this instance, the alteration creates a circuit split, and
places us firmly on the wrong side of it.36
During the Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. oral argument, Jus-
tice Neil Gorsuch relied on the plain meaning of the DFA
whistleblower anti-retaliation provision, and pointedly asked “how
much clearer could Congress have been than to say in this section the
following definitions shall apply, and whistleblower is defined as in-
cluding a report to the Commission.”37 If Congress intended for the
statute to be expanded, a broader term such as  “government agency”
could have been used instead of “Commission.”38 Congress defined the
term whistleblower using the term “Commission” twice.39 In the stat-
ute, the term “Securities and Exchange Commission” is used before the
term “Commission” is used throughout the rest of the statute.40 There
is no other mention, reference, or inference that the term “Commis-
sion” gives rise to a definition other than the Securities and Exchange
Commission. To hold that this definition is to be expanded beyond its
plain meaning without any justification grounded in a canon of con-
struction is judicial activism.
In Digital Realty Trust, the Supreme Court opines that other
laws protect whistleblowers who report wrongdoing to entities other
than the SEC.41 Some lower courts have held the opposite, and af-
firmed that the DFA anti-retaliation whistleblower statute needs to be
interpreted broadly in order to protect persons who report to other en-
tities besides the SEC.42 The Egan court argued that there is tension
between the definition of whistleblower and a subsection of the stat-
36. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
37. Oral Argument at 31, Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 138 S.Ct. 767 (2018) (No. 16-
1276), 2017 WL 5730691 at *30-1.
38. Asadi v. G.E. Energy U.S., L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 2013).
39. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6) (effective July 22, 2010) (“The term ‘whistleblower’ means
any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, informa-
tion relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”) (emphasis added).
40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(2) (“The term ‘Fund’ means the Securities and Exchange
Commission Investor Protection Fund.”).
41. Somers, 138 S.Ct. at 774 (“Clause (iii), by cross-referencing Sarbanes-Oxley and
other laws, protects disclosures made to a variety of individuals and entities in addition to
the SEC. For example, the clause shields an employee’s reports of wrongdoing to an internal
supervisor if the reports are independently safeguarded from retaliation under Sarbanes-
Oxley.”).
42. See supra note 4.
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ute.43 While the subsection does list other categories in which
disclosures may be made, it does not state that disclosures may be
made to one of these categories in lieu of reporting to the SEC.44 If the
DFA anti-retaliation whistleblower statute is properly interpreted, dis-
closures may be made to one of these categories and the SEC. In
Ellington v. Giacoumakis, the court came to the same conclusion as
Egan court when it reasoned: “Congress intended that an employee
terminated for reporting Sarbanes-Oxley . . . violations to a supervisor
or an outside compliance officer, and ultimately to the SEC, have a
private right of action under Dodd-Frank whether or not the employer
wins the race to the SEC’s door with a termination notice.”45 The Egan
and Ellington courts, as well as the other courts who ruled in a similar
manner, failed to consider that notice may have been made concur-
rently or contemporaneously.
Over the course of oral arguments, Justice Gorsuch noted that if
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections weren’t in effect, then there
is a valid argument that the DFA anti-retaliation whistleblower stat-
ute could be interpreted to cover reporting to entities other than the
SEC.46 Justice Kagan bolstered this argument by asserting: “you have
this definitional provision, and it says what it says. And it says that it
applies to this section. And you have to have a really, really severe
anomaly to get over that.”47
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Judicial Restraint Interpretation
1. Supreme Court of the United States
In a 9-0 decision the Supreme Court held that “to the Commis-
sion” is plain on its face and the statute must be interpreted so
accordingly.48 During an exchange in oral argument, Justice Gorsuch
43. Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 WL 1672066 at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (“Therefore, Plaintiff must either allege that his information was
reported to the SEC, or that his disclosures fell under the four categories of disclosures
delineated by 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) that do not require such reporting: those under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Securities Exchange Act . . . or other laws and regulations
subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.”).
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
45. Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013).
46. Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 52-54.
47. Id. at 48-49.
48. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 138 S.Ct. 767, 769 (2018) (“We next address these
concerns and explain why they do not lead us to depart from the statutory text.”).
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emphasized, “I’m just stuck on the plain language here, and maybe you
can get me unstuck, but . . . how much clearer could Congress have
been than to say in this section the following definitions shall apply,
and whistleblower is defined as including a report to the
Commission.”49
The Court acknowledges that even though the definition of
“whistleblower” has changed through different stages, it accentuated
the final definition of whistleblower.50 The Court concedes that fewer
persons will be protected by the statutory definition as compared with
the definition suggested by Respondent-Somers, however it proclaims
that in order to overcome a statutory definition there needs to be an
absurd result.51
2. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
In Asadi, the Fifth Circuit held that the plain meaning of the
term whistleblower under the DFA is not in conflict with the SEC’s
whistleblower statute.52 The court explains that while there may be
protected activity that is not within the scope of a whistleblower, this
does not equate to conflicting or superfluous statutory language.53 The
court further clarifies that a conflict between the statutes would only
exist if the three categories listed under § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)54 were to
be interpreted as additional categories.55 The Fifth Circuit noted that
since there is only one definition of whistleblower, “[t]herefore, the
whistleblower-protection provision does not contain conflicting defini-
tions of ‘whistleblower.’”56
49. Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 30-31.
50. Somers, 138 S. Ct. at 775 (“The proposed rule, the agency noted, “tracks the statu-
tory definition of a ‘whistleblower’” by requiring information reporting to the SEC itself. 75
Fed. Reg. 70489. In promulgating the final Rule, however, the agency changed course. Rule
21F–2, in finished form, contains two discrete “whistleblower” definitions. See 17 CFR
§240.21F–2(a)–(b) (2017).”).
51. Id. at 779.
52. Asadi v. G.E. Energy U.S., L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 2013).
53. Id.
54. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2010) (West, effective July 22, 2010).
55. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626 (“First, the definition of ‘whistleblower’ and the third cate-
gory of protected activity do not conflict. Conflict would exist between these statutory
provisions only if we read the three categories of protected activity as additional definitions
of three types of whistleblowers. Under that reading—which, as described above, the plain
text of the statute does not support—individuals could take actions falling within the third
category of protected activity yet fail to qualify under the more narrow definition of
whistleblower.”).
56. Id. at 627.
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The Asadi court meticulously discussed three important rea-
sons why the DFA and the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) whistleblower
statutes are to be interpreted independently instead of jointly.57 First,
the DFA statute (allowing two times back pay) provides for more mone-
tary damages than the SOX whistleblower statute (only standard back
pay).58 Second, the DFA statute allows a claim to be filed immediately
in a United States district court.59 The SOX statute requires that a
claim must first be filed with the Secretary of Labor.60 Only if the Sec-
retary of Labor fails to issue a final decision within 180 days can the
claimant  sue in a United States district court.61 Third, the statute of
limitations is longer under the DFA statute (between six to ten years
after the violation occurs) than the SOX statute (between 180 days af-
ter the violation occurs and 180 days after the employee becomes
aware of the violation).62
3. Federal District Courts
In Banko v. Apple, Inc., the court utilized canons of construction
to interpret the DFA whistleblower statute and found that the statute
is unambiguous.63 The court proclaimed that to find the statute ambig-
uous, “one would have to ignore several canons of statutory
interpretation.”64 The court lists several reasons as to why the statute
is unambiguous. First, the court notes that the term whistleblower is
statutorily defined, and the statute prohibits action from being taken
against a whistleblower.65 The syllogism is that if Congress intended to
expand the protections beyond whistleblowers it would have done so,
by using a different term.66 Second, it is noted that in order to construe
57. Id. at 629.
58. Id.
59. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629; See also 15 U.S.C.A. §78u-6(h).
60. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629.
61. Id. at 629; See also 18 U.S.C.A. §1514A(b)(1) (West, effective July 22, 2010).
62. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629.
63. Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
64. Id. at 756.
65. Id.
66. Id. (“Applying the rules of statutory interpretation set forth above, the statute is
not ambiguous; the “whistleblower protection” provided by Section 78u-6(h) is only available
to individuals who meet the Dodd-Frank definition of “whistleblower” found in Section 78u-
6(a). To conclude to the contrary, one would have to ignore several canons of statutory inter-
pretation. First, allowing individuals who did not report to the SEC to be designated a
“whistleblower” under 78u-6(a) would ignore the plain language of that statute. As the
Court held in Chevron, the first step of statutory interpretation is asking “whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter.” 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Section 78u-6(h)(1)(A) states
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that the statute as ambiguous, the phrase “to the Commission” would
need to be interpreted as superfluous.67 Yet that would  contravene the
rule against surplusage.68 Third, the title of the section—“whistle-
blower protection”—lends credence to the fact that it is applicable to
whistleblowers, which again, is defined in the statute.69 Fourth,
agency deference (in this instance, the SEC) should only be granted if
the statute is ambiguous.70 The court sagaciously opines that a whis-
tleblower can make internal notifications as well as the statutorily
required notifications.71 This is a key point that courts who interpret
the statute broadly fail to comprehend. The Banko court acknowledges
that while properly interpreting the statute according to canons of con-
struction “may sometimes lead to unfortunate results . . . this
conclusion comes as the result of that individual’s own delay and does
not bear upon the availability of [whistleblower protections under the
DFA] relief.”72
B. Judicial Activism Interpretation
1. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, the Second Circuit confesses that it
goes beyond the plain meaning of the statute in order to arrive at its
“[n]o employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or
in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower” (emphasis added). Thus,
the statute specifies that an employer may not take the above actions against a
whistleblower.”).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 757 (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)) (“It is a cardinal
principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed
that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.”).
69. Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 756.
70. Id.
71. Id. (“Finally, while the district court opinions are correct that the purpose of the
Dodd-Frank Act is to ‘improve the accountability and transparency of the financial system,’
and create ‘new incentives and protections for whistleblowers,’ it is not the only protection
available to individuals who believe they are being retaliated against for revealing securi-
ties fraud. These plaintiffs have other options. Here, the plaintiff could have filed a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor under Sarbanes-Oxley within 180 days of the pur-
ported violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D). Indeed, as discussed above, Dodd-Frank
doubled the amount of time an individual has available within which to file such a com-
plaint. The plaintiff chose not to do so. While this forfeiture may sometimes lead to
unfortunate results where individuals who take socially-desirous actions fail to be granted
protection, this conclusion comes as the result of that individual’s own delay and does not
bear upon the availability of Section 78u-6(h) relief.”).
72. Id.
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definition of whistleblower.73 The dissenting opinion in Berman notes
that the majority rewrote the DFA by employing its own definition of
whistleblower rather than the statute’s definition.74 While employed at
Neo@Ogilvy, Daniel Berman alleged that he uncovered fraudulent ac-
counting practices which violated Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles, SOX, and the DFA.75 Even though “Congress used the de-
fined term ‘whistleblower’ not once but twice” as reporting to the SEC
(“to the Commission”),76 the majority held that the definition of whis-
tleblower should be interpreted to mean reporting to other entities in
lieu of the SEC.77 In response, the dissent brilliantly articulates the
following: “No doubt, my colleagues in the majority, assisted by the
SEC or not, could improve many federal statutes by tightening them or
loosening them, or recasting or rewriting them. I could try my hand at
it. But our obligation is to apply congressional statutes as written.”78
The dissent’s position is supported by well-established precedents
holding that when determining if a term or a statute is ambiguous, the
analysis begins with “the language itself, the specific context in which
that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole.”79
The Neo@Ogilvy court surreptitiously admits it is engaging in
judicial activism by acknowledging that is interpreting the statute be-
yond its plain meaning due to public policy concerns:
First, although there may be some potential whistleblowers who
will report wrongdoing simultaneously to their employer and the
Commission, they are likely to be few in number. Some will surely
feel that reporting only to their employer offers the prospect of hav-
ing the wrongdoing ended, with little chance of retaliation, whereas
73. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We recognize that
the terms of a definitional subsection are usually to be taken literally, see Antonin Scalia and
Bryan A. Garner, “Reading Law,” Texts 227 (2012) [sic] (‘Ordinarily, judges apply text-spe-
cific definitions with rigor.’), and, pertinent to this case, usually applied to all subdivisions
literally covered by the definition, but we have also recognized that mechanical use of a statu-
tory definition’ is not always warranted.”) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 155-60 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 149.
76. Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 645 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
77. Berman, 801 F.3d at 153-54 (“Like all these courts, we confront both the definition
of ‘whistleblower’ in subsection 21F(a)(6), which extends whistleblower protection only to
employees who report violations to the Commission, and the language of subdivision (iii),
which purports to protect employees from retaliation for making reports required or pro-
tected by Sarbanes-Oxley, reports that are made internally, without notification to the
Commission.”).
78. Id. at 155 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
79. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
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reporting to a government agency creates a substantial risk of
retaliation.80
This reasoning claims that since whistleblowers will report simultane-
ously to their employer and the Commission are “few in number,” that
the statute should be interpreted to go beyond its plain meaning. How-
ever, the court is acknowledging that whistleblowers can report
simultaneously to their employer and the Commission. Additionally, in
Neo@Ogilvy, plaintiff-Berman alleges he was retaliated against before
he reported to a government agency.81 This is ironic as the court is
saying the opposite of this in order to substantiate its position.
In an effort to support its weak statutory interpretation argu-
ment, the Second Circuit relies on King v. Burwell.82 Several
commentators have claimed that the Burwell decision is judicial activ-
ism.83 The Second Circuit reasoned  that since the Burwell Court held
that the phrase “established by a state” includes the federal govern-
ment, then in the instant case “to the Commission” includes other
governmental agencies besides the SEC.84 This is an extremely flawed
analogy for several reasons. First, Burwell centered on interpreting a
U.S. Treasury regulation (26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2(a)(1)) as it pertains to
regulating healthcare.85 The Second Circuit should have looked to
other cases interpreting SEC statutes since that is what the court is
trying to determine with the phrase “to the Commission.” Also, the
court could have looked at cases interpreting whistleblower statutes,
which there is a voluminous number of.86 Second, Burwell did not base
80. Berman, 801 F.3d at 151.
81. Id. at 149.
82. Id. at 156 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015)).
83. Charles Krauthammer, Comey: A theory, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/comey-a-theory/2016/07/07/297f9bd0-4478-11e6-8856-f26de2
537a9d_story.html?utm_term=.ed51e552d417 (“When Chief Justice John Roberts used a
tortured, logic-defying argument to uphold Obamacare [King v. Burwell], he was subjected
to similar accusations of bad faith.”); see also Michael Cannon, After King v. Burwell, CATO
POLICY REPORT, Sept. – Oct. 2005, at 12, htps://www.cato.org/policy-report/septemberocto
ber-2015/after-king-v-burwell (last visited Feb. 17, 2018).
84. Berman, 801 F.3d at 150.
85. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. at 2487 (“The IRS addressed the availability of tax credits by
promulgating a rule that made them available on both State and Federal Exchanges. 77
Fed. Reg. 30378 (2012). As relevant here, the IRS Rule provides that a taxpayer is eligible
for a tax credit if he enrolled in an insurance plan through “an Exchange,” . . . which is
defined as “an Exchange serving the individual market . . . regardless of whether the Ex-
change is established and operated by a State . . . or by HHS,” 45 CFR §155.20 (2014). At
this point, 16 States and the District of Columbia have established their own Exchanges;
the other 34 States have elected to have HHS do so.”).
86. See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S.Ct. 2369 (2014); see also Carnero v. Boston Scien-
tific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 7–8, 18 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2973 (2006); Roulett v.
Am. Capital Access (In re Roulett), 2004-SOX-78 (A.L.J. Aug. 30, 2005); Stevenson v. Neigh-
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its support of the statute on a canon of construction.87 The Second Cir-
cuit followed suit. If a court performs statutory interpretation without
a canon of construction, it is admitting that there is no legal basis for
its interpretation.88 The majority in Neo@Ogilvy goes beyond the plain
meaning of the statute, presents no canon of construction to support its
interpretation, and relies on an analogy that has no similarity to the
law or case at hand.
2. Federal District Courts
In Somers v. Digital Realty Trust, Inc., the district court em-
ploys judicial activism by masquerading flawed reasoning in order to
misinterpret “to the Commission” broadly for the purpose of promoting
a public policy agenda.89 The district court acknowledges that public
policy is a central reason for finding ambiguity in the statute and thus
providing Chevron deference.90 The district court states that “reading
subsection (iii) narrowly to require a report to the Commission —
seems at odds with public policy underlying the DFA.”91
The Somers district court discloses that it is declining to inter-
pret the statute according to its plain meaning, and cites two other
cases, Bond v. United States and Yates v. United States, that engaged
borhood House Charter Sch., 2005-SOX-87 (ALJ Sept. 7, 2005); Paz v. Mary’s Center for
Maternal & Child Care, ARB No. 06-031, ALJ No. 2006-SOX-7 (ARB Nov. 30, 2007); Collins
v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2004); Savastano v. WPP Group,
PLC., 2007-SOX-34 (ALJ July 18, 2007); Bridges v. McDonalds Corp., 09-CV-1880, 2009 WL
5126962 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2009); Bozeman v. Per-Se Technologies, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d
1282, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Sharkey v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3824, 2011 WL
135026 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2011).
87. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Words no longer have meaning
if an Exchange that is not established by a State is ‘established by the State.’ It is hard to
come up with a clearer way to limit tax credits to state Exchanges than to use the words
‘established by the State.’ And it is hard to come up with a reason to include the words ‘by
the State’ other than the purpose of limiting credits to state Exchanges. . . . The Court
interprets §36B to award tax credits on both federal and state Exchanges. It accepts that
the ‘most natural sense’ of the phrase ‘Exchange established by the State’ is an Exchange
established by a State.”).
88. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 563 (2012) (“[E]very reasonable
construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”).
89. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
90. Id. at 1104. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
Supreme Court opinion increased the level of deference given by courts to administrative
agencies in their interpretation of statutory language. 467 U.S. 867 (1984). In this instance,
if Chevron deference was granted, the SEC would have been granted the deference to inter-
pret “to the Commission” to mean entities other than the SEC.
91. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1104.
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in this as well.92 The Somers district court failed to apply a canon of
construction. Rather, it cites Bond and Yates as reasons for going be-
yond the plain language of the DFA anti-whistleblower statute.93 The
Somers court concedes that the statutory language is clear, so it cre-
ates a strawman argument in that the context is ambiguous to support
its holding.94 Part of the argument is the court’s fallacious analogy
with Yates v. United States95 as a reason to disregard a plain meaning
interpretation.96 In Yates v. United States, a federal agent inspected a
ship and discovered an undersized fish which violated federal conser-
vation regulations.97 Petitioner-Captain Yates instructed his crew to
throw the fish overboard, which led to Yates being charged under 18
U.S.C. § 1519,98 which states, in part:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investi-
gation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States. . . .99
When determining that a fish is not a tangible object, the Yates major-
ity opinion uses two textual canons of construction: ejusdem generis
(“of the same kinds, class, or nature”) and noscitur a sociis (“a word is
known by the company it keeps”).100 Scalia & Garner elucidate when
ejusdem generis applies:
The ejusdem generis canon applies when a drafter has tacked on a
catchall phrase at the end of an enumeration of specifics, as in dogs,
cats, horses, cattle, and other animals. Does the phrase and other
animals refer to wild animals as well as domesticated ones? What
about a horsefly? What about protozoa? Are we to read other ani-
92. Id. at 1099-1100 (“As both Bond and Yates demonstrate, a court may decline to
strictly apply a definitional term in a statute, or otherwise adopt the plain and ordinary
meaning of statutory language, where other tools of statutory interpretation strongly sug-
gest such a result.”).
93. Id. at 1099-1100 (“Despite the statute’s clear definition of ‘chemical weapon,’ and
despite the fact that the defendant had obviously used a ‘chemical weapon’ with the neces-
sary men rea, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction.”.); Id. at 1099 (“In Yates, the
defendant had been convicted of violating a provision of Sarbanes-Oxley that prohibited the
destruction of a ‘tangible object’ with the intent to obstruct a law enforcement investigation.
Id. at 1079. The Court noted that “although dictionary definitions” of terms such as ‘tangi-
ble object’ should ‘bear consideration, they are not dispositive.’”).
94. Id.
95. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
96. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1099.
97. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1076.
98. Id. at 1078.
99. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (West, effective July 30, 2002) (emphasis added).
100. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1097.
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mals here as meaning other similar animals? The principle of
ejusdem generis says just that: It implies the addition of similar
after the word other.101
In Yates, the statute in question does not have a catchall: “any record,
document, or tangible object.”102 Similarly, the DFA does not have a
catchall.103 Thus, an ejusdem generis interpretation would be
malapropos.
Noscitur a sociis is an associated-words canon that means that
a word is defined by the words surrounding it.104 The DFA defines
“whistleblower” as, “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individ-
uals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of
the securities laws to the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, in a
manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”105 The
Supreme Court has defined noscitur a sociis as meaning, a “word is
known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often
wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to
avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.”106 In
Yates, the Court held that a fish is not a tangible object because it is
grouped with “record” and “document” and the words preceding those;
alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a
false entry.107 Fish can be altered, destroyed, mutilated, concealed,
covered up, or falsified.108 Nothing in the dictionary definition of cover
up or the other statutory terms suggests that “tangible object” is lim-
ited to a document.109 In Yates, the Court inappropriately applied the
101. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 199 (2012).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). (“Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals,
covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with
the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case
filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”) (emphasis added).
103. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6(a)(6), (h)(1)(A)(iii) (effective July 22, 2010).
104. SCALIA &. GARNER, supra note 101, at 195.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
106. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).
107. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085-86 (2015).
108. Id. See generally Tillmann J. Benfey, Use of Sterile Triploid Atlantic Salmon
(Salmo Salar L.) for Aquaculture in New Brunswick, Canada. 58 ICES J. OF MARINE SCI.
525 (2001) (discussing genetically altered salmon for mass production).
109. Destroy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“To kill (an animal) by reason of
mercy, illness, or dangerousness <the dog had to be destroyed>”). A fish is an animal and it
can be killed, so a fish can be destroyed. Additionally, mutilate means “[t]o severely and
violently damage; esp., to cut off or cut out an essential part of; to maim or cripple.” Id. For
an international perspective, New South Wales has regulations on mutilating fish, which
holds that “[a] person must not mutilate any restricted species of fish in or on or adjacent to
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noscitur a sociis canon to somehow surmise that the statute is not ap-
plicable to a tangible object.
There are no other words that are in the context of “the Com-
mission” to give credence to the interpretation that it means any other
entity besides the SEC, so a noscitur a sociis construction is inapplica-
ble. Moreover, the Somers district court does not point to the specific
language in the statute which would lead to its ejusdem generis or nos-
citur a sociis interpretations.110 Rather, it broadly points at other cases
that have employed these canons in order to conceal its judicial activ-
ism. The court does divulge it is reading the statute broadly, but it does
so without the support of a canon of construction.111 The court
clandestinely confesses that it is doing so for its own policy reasons:
Because this Court believes that the language of the DFA whistle-
blower-protection provision is at least somewhat in conflict, it is
relevant to observe that the Fifth Circuit’s resolution of that conflict
— reading subsection (iii) narrowly to require a report to the Com-
mission — seems at odds with public policy underlying the DFA.112
The court never delineates what the public policy of the DFA is, or how
its interpretation furthers the public policy over a plain meaning inter-
pretation of the statute.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN AMBIGUOUS TERM?
When courts are pondering if a statute has plain meaning or is
clear and unambiguous, it examines the language on its face, the con-
any waters in any manner other than by gutting or by removing the gills or scales.” Fisher-
ies Management (General) Regulation 2010 – REG 95, NEW SOUTH WALES CONSOLI-
DATED REGULATIONS http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_reg/fmr2010339/
s95.html. (last visited Feb. 8, 2018). Lastly, cover-up is defined as “[a]n attempt to prevent
authorities or the public from discovering the truth about something; esp., the concealment
of wrongdoing by a conspiracy of deception, nondisclosure, and destruction of evidence, usu.
combined with a refusal to cooperate with investigators.” Cover-up, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY (10th ed. 2014).
110. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A strict appli-
cation of DFA’s definition of whistleblower would, in effect, all but read subdivision (iii) out
of the statute. We should try to give effect to all statutory language. See Duncan v. Walker,
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (rejecting a statutory construction that would render a term “insig-
nificant, if not wholly superfluous”)).
111. Id. at 1048-49 (“Sarbanes-Oxley expressly protects those who lawfully provide in-
formation to federal agencies, Congress, or ‘a person with supervisory authority over the
employee.’Like Sarbanes-Oxley, DFA was passed in the wake of a financial scandal—the
subprime mortgage bubble and subsequent market collapse of 2008. . . . That DFA’s defini-
tional provision describes ‘whistleblowers’ as employees who report ‘to the Commission’
thus should not be dispositive of the scope of DFA’s later anti-retaliation provision. Terms
can have different operative consequences in different contexts.”) (citations omitted).
112. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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text of the language at issue, and the statute as a whole.113 In Asadi,
the Fifth Circuit examined the plain language of the DFA whistle-
blower statute and found that the definition of whistleblower is
unambiguous.114 Scholars have noted the appropriateness of this ap-
proach.115 Withal, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that “[t]he
statute’s unambiguous whistleblower definition, in short, precludes the
Commission from more expansively interpreting that term.”116
Despite the word “whistleblower” being defined in the DFA,
many of the courts that broadly interpreted the statute have argued
that the word “whistleblower” is ambiguous.117 These same courts base
their argument in favor of ambiguity on the third category of § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A) which states, “disclosures that are required or protected
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [, the Exchange Act,] . . . and
any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission.”118 The SOX whistleblower statute used the word “employee,”
a more generic term than the word “whistleblower.”119 It is presumed
that the same word used in different parts of a statute have the same
meaning.120 Inversely, it is presumed that different words used in the
same statute would have different meanings.121 Thus, if a statute says
weapon in the first provision and firearm in the second provision, the
second provision is read to cover guns and types of guns (i.e., pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, inter alia) but no other types of weapons (i.e.,
knifes, grenades, missiles, rockets, inter alia).
The courts that have interpreted DFA whistleblower statute
broadly have failed to definitively encapsulate how the statute is am-
113. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
114. Asadi v. G.E. Energy U.S., L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013).
115. See Andrew Walker, Why Shouldn’t We Protect Internal Whistleblowers? Exploring
Justifications for the Asadi Decision, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 1770 (2015) (“Certainly, com-
mitted textualists might argue that the Fifth Circuit was justified in relying on the text
alone.”).
116. Somers, 138 S.Ct. at 782.
117. See Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 WL 5473144, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); see also Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. CIV.A. 13-4149
(SDW)(MCA), 2014 WL 940703, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014) aff’d on other grounds, 773
F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) L.L.C., 984 F. Supp. 2d 141,
147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013) aff’d
in part, appeal dismissed in part, 566 F. App’x 719 (10th Cir. 2014); Murray v. UBS Sec.,
LLC, No. 12 CIV. 5914 (JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (West, effective July 22, 2010).
119. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514(A) (West, effective Dec. 7, 2012).
120. Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)
(“[T]here is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same
act are intended to have the same meaning.”).
121. See id.
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biguous. These same courts have purposefully conflated their own
interpretation of Congressional intent with statutory ambiguity. This
is a completely unfounded application of statutory ambiguity. A statue
is ambiguous if a natural reading of the text is elusive.122 The text of
the DFA whistleblower statute, as well as the statutory definition of
whistleblower, has a clear meaning and is unambiguous.123
The courts that interpret the DFA anti-retaliation whistle-
blower statute as ambiguous are conducting judicial activism because
they are well-aware that Chevron deference will give them confirma-
tion bias by providing the interpretation they want. Courts are able to
do this because “the determination of ambiguity by the judiciary is en-
tirely standardless and discretionary.”124 Justice Scalia expounded,
“[c]ongress now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether inten-
tionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the bounds of
permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular
agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.”125 Moreover,
Justice Gorsuch took the Second and Fifth Circuits to task for granting
Chevron deference due to an “ipsi dixit unreasoned opinion.”126 Justice
Gorsuch clarified that there is a procedural problem, as there was not a
reasonable notice and comment opportunity which the SEC would then
defer to its own interpretation.127 Congress established notice and com-
ment rules128 to establish a minimum threshold of procedural
requirements that agencies are required to adhere by in order to “ to
122. In re Rogers, 513 F.3d 212, 226 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599
F.3d 298, 304 (3rd Cir. 2010), asamended (May 7, 2010) (quoting Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d
259, 264 (3d Cir. 2005)) (“A provision is ambiguous only where the disputed language is
‘reasonably susceptible of different interpretations.’”).
123. Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 646 (E.D. Wis. 2014)
(“[T]he belief that there is some kind of conflict in the statute is based on a flawed under-
standing of the concept of statutory ambiguity. No term or phrase in the statute is actually
ambiguous. Instead, courts perceiving ambiguity appear flummoxed by the simple fact that
the protections in the statute extend to activity beyond the activity that qualifies an em-
ployee for protection. But, as discussed above, there is nothing ‘ambiguous’ or conflicting
about such a framework at all. Accordingly, the plain language Congress employed should
be given full effect.”).
124. Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69
MD. L. REV. 791, 794 (2010) (emphasis added).
125. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989).
126. Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 38.
127. Id. at 37-39.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (1976).
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afford parties affected by administrative [rulemaking] a means of
knowing what their rights are and how they may be protected.”129
The Berman dissenting opinion reveals that the majority opin-
ion agrees that the Asadi interpretation is the more natural statutory
interpretation but masquerades their agenda by claiming that the stat-
ute is ambiguous.130 Surprisingly, the majority’s opinion admits that it
could not explain how the language of the statute is not ambiguous,
but rather waxes poetic whether the plain language of the statutes is
its intended meaning.131 The reason for the broad interpretation is due
to public policy concerns, and the courts that adopt this interpretation
may feel that a narrow interpretation will discourage whistleblow-
ers.132 This is an understated confirmation that the majority was
engaging in judicial activism since they are stating that the law should
be interpreted a manner that is congenial with their policy views.
Holding that the word whistleblower in the DFA is ambiguous
would render the entire definitional section of the statute superfluous.
The Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc. court concluded as such,
and proceeded to  call out another court for judicial activism in falsely
claiming that broadly interpreting the DFA whistleblower statute
would not render the law superfluous.133 Under the canons of construc-
129. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. DOC. NO. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1946).
130. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 157 (2d Cir. 2015) (Jacobs, J., dissent-
ing) (“The majority hardly disputes that my reading (and the reading given in Asadi) is the
more natural reading of the statute.”).
131. Id. at 150 (“In our case, the statutory provision relied on by the Appellees and our
dissenting colleague contains the phrase ‘provide . . . to the Commission,’ but the issue is not
whether that phrase means something other than what it literally says.4 Instead, the issue
is whether the statutory provision applies to another provision of the statute, or, more pre-
cisely, whether the answer to that question is sufficiently unclear to warrant Chevron
deference to the Commission’s regulation. (n.4: We do not doubt that “provide . . . to the
Commission” means “provide . . . to the Commission.”)).
132. Thomas S. Markey, “Whistleblower” Redefined: Implications of the Recent Interpre-
tative Split on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Provision, 33 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 441, 449 (2014) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit’s interpretation may discourage employees
from reporting internally . . . . ”); Nicole H. Sprinzen, Asadi v. GE Energy (USA) L.L.C.: A
Case Study of the Limits of Dodd-Frank Anti-Retaliation Protections and the Impact on Cor-
porate Compliance Objectives, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 151, 193 (2014) (“[I]t is common sense
that employees would be much less likely to raise concerns about possible legal violations
internally when the employees do not believe that they will have employment protection if
they raise these concerns.”).
133. Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 645 (E.D. Wis. 2014)
(quoting Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 2014 WL 940703, *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11,
2014) (“Ironically, one district court found that accepting the SEC’s broader interpretation
of the rule would “harmonize” the supposed contradictions “while not rendering any word or
section superfluous. . . . Yet the opposite is true. The SEC’s interpretation renders an entire
section of the statute superfluous, namely, the definition of “whistleblower” itself. Congress
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tion, when a court interprets a statute it must give reasonable
meaning to the words without rendering any of the language superflu-
ous.134 A term or statute is ambiguous if the text is not clear, or if it
can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way.135 If a term is
defined it does not necessarily make it unambiguous. A term may be
defined, but the definition may be ambiguous. If a term is undefined, it
is not necessarily ambiguous. An undefined term may be
unambiguous.
Even if a court finds that the statutorily defined term “whistle-
blower” is ambiguous, the Supreme Court has held that ambiguous
financial regulations must be construed narrowly. In SEC v. Zandford,
the Court held that S.E.C. Rule 10b-5 is ambiguous.136 While the Court
did note that the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal
adjudication, is entitled to deference, it qualified the interpretation as
such, “the statute must not be construed broadly as to convert every
common-law fraud that happens to involve securities into a violation of
§ 10(b).”137 The Court also noted that if the plain language is unambig-
uous, a statute may be expanded if there wasn’t sufficient legal
protections of a class of persons.138 Moreover, the Court found that
there is a significant amount of whistleblower protection laws, and
descried that one of the aforementioned laws criminalizes retaliation
against whistleblowers who provide information to the SEC for “any
federal offense.”139 Notwithstanding the unambiguous plain language,
with a large number of other whistleblower laws, including a broad law
that protects whistleblowers including the scenario put forth by the
Respondent, the Court was most likely reluctant to expand the law to
capture every single whistleblower retaliation scenario.
could not have defined ‘whistleblower’ more clearly, and yet the SEC apparently believes
that entire definition should be cast aside on the flimsy grounds that Congress really didn’t
mean it.”) (emphasis added).
134. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).
135. In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Rather, a provision is ambiguous
when, despite a studied examination of the statutory context, the natural reading of a provi-
sion remains elusive. In such situations of unclarity, ‘where the mind labours to discover the
design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived . . . ’ ”) (quoting
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805)).
136. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002).
137. Id. at 820 (emphasis added).
138. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 138 S.Ct. 767, 781 (2018) (“Their view, which would
not require an employee to provide information relating to a securities-law violation to the
SEC, could afford Dodd-Frank protection to an employee who reports information bearing
no relationship whatever to the securities laws. That prospect could be imagined based on
the broad array of federal statutes and regulations cross-referenced by clause (iii) of the
antiretaliation provision.”).
139. Id.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the DFA whistleblower anti-retalia-
tion provision does not reflect Congress’s intent as to the central issue
of whether whistleblowers are required to report to the SEC in order to
avail themselves of the DFA’s anti-retaliation provision. Most of the
legislative history, as most of the parley, focuses on the bounty provi-
sions.140 Notwithstanding, there are several courts that claim
otherwise in an attempt to masquerade their judicial activism under
the façade of an original intent interpretation, doing so through the
act’s supposed legislative intent and legislative history.141 Coming to a
140. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 870 (2010) (“The subtitle further enhances in-
centives and protections for whistleblowers providing information leading to successful SEC
enforcement actions. Awards to whistleblowers will range from 10 percent to 30 percent of
the amounts collected by the SEC in actions where the SEC obtained monetary sanctions
exceeding $1 million. The subtitle also works to protect the confidentiality of whistleblow-
ers.”); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38, 110 (2010) (“The Whistleblower Program, established and
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, is intended to provide monetary
rewards to those who contribute ‘original information’ that lead to recoveries of monetary
sanctions of $1,000,000 or more in criminal and civil proceedings . . . . The Whistleblower
Program aims to motivate those with inside knowledge to come forward and assist the Gov-
ernment to identify and prosecute persons who have violated securities laws and recover
money for victims of financial fraud.”); 156 CONG. REC. S5916, S5929 (daily ed. Jul. 15,
2010) (statement of Sen. Reed and Sen. Dodd) (“I also support the establishment of a pro-
gram to reward whistleblowers when the SEC brings significant enforcement actions based
upon original information provided by the whistleblower, and I look forward to the SEC
rules that will detail the framework for this program . . . . Title IX, subtitle B creates many
new powers for the SEC. The SEC is expected to use these powers responsibly to better
protect investors. Section 922 has been amended to eliminate the right of a whistleblower to
appeal the amount of an award. While the whistleblower cannot appeal the SEC’s monetary
award determination, this provision is intended to limit the SEC’s administrative burden
and not to encourage making small awards. The Congress intends that the SEC make
awards that are sufficiently robust to motivate potential whistleblowers to share their infor-
mation and to overcome the fear of risk of the loss of their positions. Unless the
whistleblowers come forward, the Federal Government will not know about the frauds and
misconduct.”).
141. Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *5 (D.
Conn. Sept. 25, 2012) (“Yet the Dodd-Frank Act appears to have been intended to expand
upon the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley, and thus the claimed problem is no problem at all.”)
(emphasis added); Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, No. 12-5914 (JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (“Defendants claim that this interpretation ‘disrupt[s] the care-
fully-constructed anti-retaliation program established by Sarbanes-Oxley,’ by providing a
longer statute of limitations and providing ‘more generous’ protections that Congress in-
tended . . . . But as the Court explained in Kramer, considering the congressional intent to
expand on the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley, ‘the claimed [statute of limitations] problem is
no problem at all.’ ”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted); Rosenblum v. Thomson
Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2013) (“Rosenblum, in
turn, argues that several recent district court decisions, including some within the Second
Circuit, have found that Congress did not intend such a narrow interpretation of the DFA.
When considering the DFA as a whole, it is plain that a narrow reading of the statute requir-
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similar outcome as the aforementioned courts, the Ninth Circuit does
not explicitly point to where in the legislative history there is evidence
to support their claim, but rather declares that this assumption may be
inferred from the text of the statute.142 In Ellington, the court doesn’t
even try to make this argument, but rather subjectively contends that
the language of the statute itself shows Congressional intent: “It is ap-
parent from the wording and positioning of § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) that
Congress intended that an employee terminated for reporting
Sarbanes-Oxley violations to a supervisor or an outside compliance of-
ficer, and ultimately to the SEC, have a private right of action under
Dodd-Frank. . . .”143 Stating that legislative history indicates a certain
perspective when there is no clear evidence that it does is indicative of
a court manifesting its views rather than objectively interpreting the
law.
During oral argument, Digital Realty Trust argued that there is
no legislative history cited in the Respondent’s brief except for an arti-
cle from a legal commentary website.144 This is revealing, as it
encapsulates that Respondent-Somers subtlety acknowledges that the
legislative history is not strong enough to support its position. If the
Respondent felt that there was sufficient support, the legislative his-
tory would have likely been cited in the brief. Rather, instead of relying
on what the legislative history is, Somers relied on a third-party arti-
cles espousing its views on what it believes the legislative history is.145
In Egan, the court notes the flaw in relying upon the legislative
history of the DFA to find the whistleblower provisions ambiguous:
“The legislative history of the Act provides little evidence of Congress’s
purpose. The various committee reports and debates in Congress focus
on the bounty provisions of the Act and contain very few substantive
ing a report to the SEC conflicts with the anti-retaliation provision, which does not have
such a requirement. Thus, the governing statute is ambiguous.”) (emphasis added).
142. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Subdivision
(iii) was added after the bill went through Committee. There is no legislative history explain-
ing its purpose, but its language illuminates congressional intent. By broadly incorporating,
through subdivision (iii), Sarbanes-Oxley’s disclosure requirements and protections, DFA
necessarily bars retaliation against an employee of a public company who reports violations
to the boss, i.e., one who ‘provide[s] information’ regarding a securities law violation to ‘a
person with supervisory authority over the employee.’ 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).”) (emphasis
added).
143. Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013) (emphasis
added).
144. Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 25.
145. Brief of Respondent at 5-6, Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S.Ct. 767, 777
(2018).
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discussions of its anti-retaliation provisions.”146 Of those few reports
and debates that do discuss the anti-retaliation provisions, none touch
upon the issue of whether reporting to the SEC is required for whistle-
blowers to avail themselves of the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions.147
Often the debates surrounding the DFA focused more on the allocation
of the funds of the whistleblower payout as opposed to how it is to be
interpreted in relation to the SEC’s rules.148 Senator Menendez does
mention that there are “inconsistencies with current law,” but does not
address tensions with other statutes in relation to reporting require-
ments.149 The inconsistencies that Senator Menendez spoke of are
related to due process rights of whistleblowers. His viewpoint is that
the legal protections of whistleblowers by updating the retaliation rem-
edies under SOX (increasing the number of days to file a claim to 180
from 90; “clearer right to a jury trial”; and eliminating gag orders that
are in employer contracts).150 These Senators, along with the rest of
Congress, were aware of possible tensions with other SEC rules, yet
did not once mention a possible tension with the SEC whistleblower
anti-retaliation provision.
146. Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 WL 1672066 at *4
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (emphasis added).
147. 156 Cong. Rec. S3975 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (focusing
on the confidentiality aspect of the anti-retaliation provisions).
148. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 870 (2010); see also 156 CONG. REC. S4076 (daily
ed. May, 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Shelby) (“The whistleblower provisions are well-inten-
tioned attempts to address the SEC’s failure during the Madoff scandal. However, the
guaranteed massive minimum payouts and limited SEC flexibility ensure that a line of
claimants will form at the SEC’s door hoping for some of the hundreds of millions in the
whistleblower pot. The SEC will spend limited resources sorting through these claims that
would have been better spent bringing enforcement cases.”).
149. 156 CONG. REC. S3153 (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Menendez)
(“Lastly, I wish to talk about whistleblower protections. They are the first and most effective
line of defense against corporate fraud and other misconduct, yet because of inadequate
protections against retaliation, would-be corporate whistleblowers often keep quiet when
they could be protecting the public from illegal activity. As we have seen in the emerging
Lehman Brothers scandal, a whistleblower who tried to alert management to illegal ac-
counting tricks was fired. Though the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did much to expand
protection of corporate whistleblowers from retaliation, it lacks several modern whistle-
blower protections that have been standard in every piece of legislation since 2006. My
amendment updates Sarbanes-Oxley protections against retaliation by giving whistleblow-
ers 180 days to file a claim instead of the 90 that exists right now; giving whistleblowers
their day in court with a clearer right to a jury trial; clarifying that whistleblowers are
entitled to compensatory damages; strengthening due process rights for whistleblowers by
eliminating inconsistencies in current law; preventing employers from gagging whistleblow-
ers by holding them to contractual obligations; ensuring that whistleblowers will be
protected for all disclosures of material misconduct.”).
150. 156 CONG. REC. S3153 (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Menendez).
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Senator Christopher Dodd, who co-authored the eponymous
Dodd-Frank Act, made remarks about the whistleblower provision of
the DFA in regard to how it should be interpreted in relation to the
SEC’s provision.151 Senator Dodd explained that the provision “is in-
tended to limit the SEC’s administrative burden and not to encourage
making small awards.”152 The statutory canon expressio unius est ex-
clusion alterius is defined as “the inclusion of one thing excludes the
other.”153 “It is a rule of negative implication: by including some things,
the legislature intentionally left out others.”154 For example, if a law-
yer says that her practice areas are banking & finance, capital
markets, and mergers and acquisitions, it is ordinarily understood that
she does not practice family law. Applying the statutory canon expres-
sio unius est exclusion alterius, it can be inferred that Senator Dodd
either did not think there was tension with the SEC’s whistleblower
anti-retaliation provision (and as such, courts should defer to the
SEC’s rule) or Congress did not consider it at all. If the former is true,
this substantiates the notion that courts are engaging in judicial activ-
ism by stating that the legislative history and intent articulates a
particular opinion, when it does not. If the latter is true, this also rein-
forces the notion that courts are engaging in judicial activism, since
Congress did not consider a possible tension between the statutes at
play yet courts are importing intent when blazoning that Congress did
consider it.
Senator Patrick Leahy makes sustained comments on the anti-
retaliation provisions of the DFA whistleblower statute, but the focus
is on confidentiality.155 Senator Leahy centered his argument on the
notion that there is not sufficient privacy for whistleblowers under the
then-proposed bill due to overbroad language.156 Senator Leahy’s re-
marks make no reference nor inference that there is tension with the
SEC’s whistleblower statute. Senator Leahy clearly examined the lan-
guage of the anti-retaliation provisions of the DFA whistleblower
151. 156 CONG. REC. S5929 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
152. Id.
153. LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 165 (2006).
154. Id.
155. 156 CONG. REC. S3975 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“My
amendments addresses [sic] two key problems with the whistleblower provisions in the bill:
First, the bill would prevent whistleblowers from obtaining information that they them-
selves have provided to government regulators under any circumstances. Second, the bill
creates an unnecessary exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, that would, in
some cases, shield critical information about financial fraud from the public indefinitely.”).
156. Id.
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statute as he felt compelled to address aspects of it that he felt were
not sufficient. If Senator Leahy believed that the language of the anti-
retaliation provisions of the DFA whistleblower statute is at odds with
the SEC’s whistleblower statute, he would have made such remarks.
During oral argument, Justice Kagan noted that the statutory
definition clearly states how the DFA anti-whistleblower statute
should be interpreted, despite recognizing that subsection (iii) was ad-
ded late, even granting “[i]t’s odd; it’s peculiar; probably not what
Congress meant.”157
The Somers district court expresses a logical fallacy when it
reasons that since “[s]ubsection (iii) was added to the DFA at the very
last minute,”158 a whistleblower does not have to report to the SEC
since “this construction accords with the legislative history.”159 To ex-
plain this incoherent argument, the court elaborates that “given the
belated addition of subsection (iii), it is at least reasonable to assume
that Congress intended for the scope of the DFA whistleblower-provi-
sions to be broader than in earlier versions of the bill, which versions
unambiguously required an external report to the Commission in order
to be protected from employer retaliation.”160 The statute clearly does
require reporting to the Commission. The DFA whistleblower anti-re-
taliation provision states:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, di-
rectly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because
of any lawful act done by the whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with
this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or
judicial or administrative action of the Commission based upon or
related to such information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter,
including section 78j–1 (m) of this title, section 1513 (e) of title 18,
157. Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 48-49.
158. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
159. Id. But see Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 48 (“[I]t’s quite possible the way this
provision gets in very late in the game, that they didn’t know that they’ll—they forgot about
this definitional provision, and they were meaning it more in the ordinary-language sense.
But there you are, you have this definitional provision, and it says what it says. And it says
that it applies to this section.”).
160. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1103.
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and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission.161
The change in text the court is referring to is regarding the earlier
version of the text read that read as follows: “[T]he Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), including section 10A(m) of
such Act (15 U.S.C. 78f(m)). . . .”162 However, both versions of subsec-
tion (iii) contained the key phrase, “to the Commission.”163 In Exxon v.
Allapattah Servs., the Supreme Court expressed; “[a]s we have repeat-
edly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the
legislative history or any other extrinsic material.”164 The Somers court
has no statutory cannon in which to support its interpretation of the
text, so it has subjectively determined how the statute should be read
according to the timing of the text. Whether subsection (iii) was added
in the very first draft or the very last draft, it should not figure into
statutory interpretation. The statutory text, states, in part, “in making
disclosures . . . and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.”165 It is clear, from both legislative his-
tory and the statutory text, that the DFA requires whistleblowers to
report to the SEC in order to avail themselves to SEC protections.
After relying on legislative history to support its interpretation
of subsection (iii) was added late to the DFA, the Somers district court
admits that it “does [not] appear to have ever been discussed in the
legislative record.”166 Subverting their own argument that the lack of
legislative history indicates a broad interpretation of “to the Commis-
sion” (i.e. to anyone other than the SEC), the Somers district court
admits; “[c]ertainly, the legislative history contains no indication,
apart from the definition of whistleblower itself, that Congress purpose-
fully intended to limit whistleblower protections under (iii) solely to
161. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (West, effective July 22, 2010) (emphasis
added).
162. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1846 (2010).
163. See id.
164. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (emphasis added)
(“Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a
reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.
Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative understandings,
however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious criticisms. First,
legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. Judicial investiga-
tion of legislative history has a tendency to become, to borrow Judge Leventhal’s memorable
phrase, an exercise in ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”).
165. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)(iii) (West, effective July 22, 2010) (emphasis added).
166. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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those making reports to the Commission.”167 “Congress could not have
defined ‘whistleblower’ more clearly, and yet the SEC apparently be-
lieves that entire definition should be cast aside on the flimsy grounds
that Congress really didn’t mean it.”168
Moreover, the Somers district court utilizes a tortured argu-
ment on legislative history to justify its position that the DFA
whistleblower statute is ambiguous.169 The Somers court notes:
[S]ubsections (i) and (ii) expressly refer to providing information or
testimony to the Commission, while (iii) makes no similar reference
to the Commission. The difference in language, wherein the key
qualification articulated in (i) and (ii) is omitted from (iii), suggests
a legislative intent that (iii) not be read to require SEC reporting.170
The statutory canon expressio unius est exclusion alterius, “[p]roperly
invoked . . . prevents expanding an enumerated list of items or excep-
tions; it does not create new substantive rights by negative
inference.”171 Here, the court’s reasoning is contrary to the statutory
canon as it is holding that since language is omitted it does mean that
a private cause of action is created. In contrast to the Somers district
court, the Asadi court correctly notes that a whistleblower under
§ 78u-6(h) creates a private cause of action only for individuals who
provided information to the Commission (SEC) relating to a securities
law violation.172 If the statute were to include reporting to persons
other than to the Commission, the statute would have been authored
in such a manner.
While legislative history may be used for statutory interpreta-
tion, courts should be cautious on overreliance of legislative history.
Justice Thomas reckoned that the Court is “governed by what Con-
gress enacted rather than by what it intended.”173 To illustrate his
point, Justice Thomas included an interesting colloquy between Sena-
tor Bill Armstrong and Senator Bob Dole, as well as provides a quote
from a federal judge describing his experience as a Senate staffer:
“[M]ost members of Congress . . . have no idea at all about what is in
the legislative history for a particular bill.”174 Scalia & Garner thor-
oughly explain that legislative history is unreliable as it easily
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 645 (E.D. Wis. 2014)
169. See Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1103.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. See, e.g., Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 855 F. Supp. 2d 159, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
172. Asadi v. G.E. Energy U.S., L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013).
173. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 138 S.Ct. 767, 783 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
174. Id.
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manipulated.175 This is accentuated when the Berman court states
that the lack of legislative history means “to the Commission” is to be
interpreted broadly.176 While reading the same legislative materials,
and quite possibly sharing the same political preferences, the liberal
Justices interpreted the statute differently from the Second and Ninth
Circuits. In Blanchard v. Bergeron, Justice Scalia forewarned the use
of relying on legislative history because it is susceptible to an array of
interpretations due to the complexity and volume of materials.177
V. PUBLIC POLICY
The political ideologies at play in defining “whistleblower” in
the DFA are pro-business (narrow interpretation) and pro-consumer/
employee or ‘little guy’ (broad interpretation). These political ideologies
were pronounced during the Senate confirmation hearings of Justice
Neil Gorsuch’s SCOTUS nomination.178 The pro-business ideology is
portrayed as ruling for corporations rather than individuals.179
175. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 101, at 376-77 (2012) (“Further, the use of legislative
history to find ‘purpose’ in a statute is a legal fiction that provides great potential for manip-
ulation and distortion. The more courts have relied on legislative history, the less reliable
that legislative history has become. . . . Legislative history creates mischief both coming and
going – not only when it is made but also when it is used. With major legislation, the legisla-
tive history has something for everyone.”).
176. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Ultimately, we
think it doubtful that the conferees who accepted the last-minute insertion of subdivision
(iii) would have expected it to have the extremely limited scope it would have if it were
restricted by the Commission reporting requirement in the ‘whistleblower’ definition in sub-
section 21F(a)(6). If we had to choose between reading the statute literally or broadly to
carry out its apparent purpose, we might well favor the latter course.”).
177. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
178. Jeffrey Rosen, A Supreme Court Nominee Alert to the Dangers of Big Business, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/gorsuchs-
nuanced-record-on-business/520101/ (“The Center for American Progress argues that ‘if he
becomes a justice, the Supreme Court would very likely continue its trend of ruling in favor
of big business.’ The Constitutional Accountability Center warns that confirming Gorsuch
on the Court ‘would further solidify the hold that big business has on the Court, as exempli-
fied by the increasing success of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce before the Roberts Court.’
The Chamber of Commerce, by contrast, has celebrated his nomination as ‘fantastic’”);
Debra Cassens Weiss, Gorsuch confirmation hearings, Day 4: He is portrayed as empathetic,
yet bad for the little guy, A.B.A J. (Mar. 23, 2017, 3:44 PM), (“Representatives of liberal
groups, on the other hand, portrayed Gorsuch as a judge who rules against the little guy and
relies on the Oxford English Dictionary rather than common sense in applying laws designed
to protect workers.”) (emphasis added) http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/gorsuch_con
firmation_hearings_day_4_aba_testimony_expected.
179. See id.
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Relying on dictionary definitions of words is textualism, a canon
of construction.180 Interpreting law based upon ‘common sense’ is sub-
jective. Common sense is not a canon of construction, but rather what a
person perceives how things ought to be.
Courts that interpret the definition of “whistleblower” broadly
are trying to protect employees, or the little guy, due to the backlash
that whistleblowers experience. There is the practical notion that em-
ployees are already unwilling to come forward about misconduct and
wrongdoing over fear of risking their careers:
Lower-level employees, particularly those in financial positions,
may have information about the financial irregularities but are
often unwilling to risk their careers by blowing the whistle. With-
out an insider providing information about the types of transactions
that should be looked at, the accounting misconduct may not
emerge for years, if ever.181
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, whom is considered to have lib-
eral views,182 who penned the majority opinion professed “[t]he plain-
text reading of the statute undoubtedly shields fewer individuals from
retaliation than the alternative,”183 and still held that the DFA anti-
whistleblower retaliation statute does not extend to those who report
wrongdoing to entities other than the SEC.
The perception that whistleblowers, particularly those in financial po-
sitions, have no bulwark is unfounded. In 2010, a Wells Fargo
employee made an internal report about suspected illegal business
practices, and he was subsequently fired.184 The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) held that he “lost his job after re-
porting suspected fraudulent behavior to superiors and a bank ethics
hotline.”185 OSHA ruled that the employee be awarded $5.4 million
and that Wells Fargo must rehire him.
In another instance, a bank executive was reprimanded for pos-
sibly attempting to retaliate against a whistleblower. James E. Staley,
the Chief Executive Officer (C.E.O.) of Barclays, tried to uncover the
identity of an anonymous employee who sent letters to company offi-
cials regarding the behavior of another executive, whom he worked
180. See generally George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U.L. REV. 321 (1995).
181. Peter J. Henning, Come Blow Your Horn for the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2010
12:32 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/come-blow-your-horn-to-the-s-e-c/.
182. See supra note 180.
183. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 138 S.Ct. 767, 779 (2018).
184. Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Whistle-Blower Wins $5.4 Million and His Job Back,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/business/04-wells-fargo-
whistleblower-fired-osha.html.
185. Id.
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with previously at another company.186 An independent investigation
by a law firm found that Staley held a mistaken belief that he was
allowed to identify the whistleblower.187 Mr. Staley will face several
repercussions for his actions; his bonus will be notably reduced, he
made a number of public apologies, shareholders have asked him to
step down as C.E.O., and a proxy advisor recommended that share-
holders withhold their vote for his reelection to the board.188
Several politicians have acknowledged the adversity that a
whistleblower will likely face189. Whistleblowers may be seen as dis-
loyal not only by the employer they reported, but also by other
potential employers.190 Senator Dodd remarked: “The Congress in-
tends that the SEC make awards that are sufficiently robust to
motivate potential whistleblowers to share their information and to
overcome the fear of risk of the loss of their positions. Unless the whis-
tleblowers come forward, the Federal Government will not know about
the frauds and misconduct.”191
There are numerous federal statutory schemes providing whis-
tleblowers protection from retaliation.192 Whistleblowers have to
operate within the confines of the law in order to avail themselves to
the appurtenant protections.193 If courts decide to expand the law be-
186. Kate Kelly & Chad Bray, Barclays C.E.O. Investigated Over Treatment of Whistle-
Blower, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/business/dealbook/
barclays-jes-staley-whistleblower.html.
187. Id.
188. Chad Bray, Barclays C.E.O. Apologizes for Handling of Whistle-Blower Complaint,
N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/business/dealbook/bar
clays-james-staley-whistle-blower.html?_r=0.
189. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38, 110-12, 217-18 (2010) (“Recognizing that whistleblowers
often face the difficult choice between telling the truth and the risk of committing ‘career
suicide.’”).
190. See Debra Wroge, Whistleblowers: Loyal Corporate Employee or Disloyal Employee?
35 COMM. THEATER ASS’N MINN. J. 33 (2008). Jeffrey S. Wigand was a former tobacco execu-
tive who blew the whistle on his company, lost his job, and went from making $300,000 per
year plus stock options to making $30,000 teaching at a high school when he was “cast as a
turncoat for spilling company secrets.” Rick Lyman, A Tobacco Whistle-Blower’s Life is
Transformed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/15/us/a-tobacco-
whistle-blower-s-life-is-transformed.html.
191. 156 CONG. REC. S5929 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (emphasis
added).
192. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (1977); Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49
U.S.C. § 31105(a) (2007); Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability
Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9610(a) (1980); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 42 U.S.C.
§ 5851(b) (2005); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1950).
193. See generally, an employee who alleges that he or she has been terminated or oth-
erwise discriminated against in violation of CERCLA’s whistleblower provisions may,
within thirty days, apply to the Secretary of Labor for review. 42 U.S.C. § 9610(a); An em-
ployee who alleges that he or she has been terminated or otherwise discriminated against in
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yond its plain meaning in order to protect persons who exposed
wrongdoing, then it undermines having whistleblower laws alto-
gether.194 Moreover, expanding the law beyond the statutory definition
does not take into account the reasons for having said laws, and while
the law is viewed broadly, the reasoning for the expansion is narrow-
minded.195
Courts interpreting the DFA anti-whistleblower statute broadly
do so by injecting their views on what the law should be, and clearly
ignore the plain language of the statute. The Somers district court im-
properly reasoned that public policy favors a broad interpretation of
the DFA anti-whistleblower statute.196 The court questionably states
that “[b]ecause this Court believes that the language of the DFA whis-
tleblower-protection provision is at least somewhat in conflict . . .—
reading subsection (iii) narrowly to require a report to the Commis-
sion—seems at odds with public policy underlying the DFA.”197 The
district court does not state how precisely the language is in conflict
based on a canon of construction. Withal, the court does not show
where the legislative intent states the public policy. The district court
holds that a statutory definition may be expanded based on other
materials, such as “historic origins and legislative purpose of the
law.”198 However, the district court does not cite any research, data, or
evidence to support its claim. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Sotomayor professed how legislative history is useful in interpreting
law but declined to state that legislative history in this instance sup-
violation of FDA Food Safety Modernization Act’s whistleblower provisions may file a com-
plaint with the Secretary of Labor within 180 days after the date on which the violation
occurs. 21 U.S.C. § 399d(b)(1) (2011); Any employee who alleges that he or she has been
terminated or discriminated against in violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1972 (“FWCPA”) whistleblower provisions may, within thirty days after such alleged vio-
lation occurs, apply to the Secretary of Labor for a review. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1984). These
statutes specify the timeframe for which claims must be brought. If a person tries to bring a
claim after the defined period of which the alleged violation occurs, they will not be able to
avail themselves to a remedy under the respective law.
194. See infra § VIII, absurdity section.
195. Somers, 138 S.Ct. at 779 (“Moreover, even where the employer knows of the SEC
reporting, the third clause may operate to dispel a proof problem: The employee can recover
under the statute without having to demonstrate whether the retaliation was motivated by
the internal report (thus yielding protection under clause (iii)) or by the SEC disclosure
(thus gaining protection under clause (i))”).
196. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1104 (“v. Policy Reasons Support a Finding of Ambigu-
ity. “Put simply, requiring SEC reporting adds nothing to the policy of deterring employer
retaliation.”) (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1099.
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ported an interpretation that “to the Commission” means entities other
than the SEC.199
One court broadly interpreted the DFA anti-whistleblower stat-
ute and decided to radically contort the law by applying it retroactively
as well as holding that it provides a private right of action. In Ellington
v. Giacoumakis, the court concedes that plaintiff-Ellington did not pro-
vide information to the SEC until after he was terminated., but held
that a plaintiff has a “a private right of action under Dodd–Frank
whether or not the employer wins the race to the SEC’s door with a
termination notice.”200 This reasoning is flawed for it goes against the
plain language of the statute.201 If Ellington had made the complaint
and were then terminated, he would have been protected. However,
Ellington was terminated and then he made the complaint,202 and thus
was outside the scope of the statute. There is a presumption against
retroactivity.203 Moreover, the court contends that there is an implied
private right of action based on its assumption of Congressional intent
on the “wording and positioning” of the statute.204 No other court, even
those that broadly interpreted the DFA anti-whistleblower statute,
found it created an implied private right of action. Typically, a statute
expressly provides a remedy for plaintiffs in the class whose benefit the
statute was enacted.205 As discussed supra in this Article, there is a
199. Somers, 138 S.Ct. at 782 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Legislative history is of
course not the law, but that does not mean it cannot aid us in our understanding of a law.
Just as courts are capable of assessing the reliability and utility of evidence generally, they
are capable of assessing the reliability and utility of legislative-history materials.”).
200. Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 46 (D. Mass. 2013) (“There is no
dispute that after his termination, Ellington provided the SEC with a detailed report of
NEINV’s alleged violations, assisted the SEC in its investigation of NEINV, and was the
instigator of the SEC’s assessment of civil penalties against NEINV, all of which occurred
after Dodd–Frank took effect.”).
201. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6) (West, effective July 22, 2010).
202. See supra note 200.
203. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. U. S. ex rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314 (1908)
(“The presumption is very strong that a statute was not meant to act retrospectively, and it
ought never to receive such a construction if it is susceptible of any other.”).
204. Ellington, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (“The SEC’s construction is the more persuasive. It
is apparent from the wording and positioning of § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) that Congress intended
that an employee terminated for reporting Sarbanes-Oxley violations to a supervisor or an
outside compliance officer, and ultimately to the SEC, have a private right of action under
Dodd-Frank whether or not the employer wins the race to the SEC’s door with a termination
notice.”) (emphasis added).
205. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 (1979) (The Court states that a fe-
male plaintiff has an implied private right of action because she is protected by
discrimination that Congress had in mind when it enacted Title IX.) (“The language in these
statutes—which expressly identifies the class Congress intended to benefit—contrasts
sharply with statutory language customarily found in criminal statutes . . . and other laws
enacted for the protection of the general public. There would be far less reason to infer a
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lack of legislative intent regarding the DFA anti-whistleblower
statute.206
Yet, inferring a private cause of action should seldom, if ever, be
employed. In a dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago,
Justice Powell stated, “[a]bsent the most compelling evidence of affirm-
ative congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a private
cause of action.”207 This set the table for how the Court would later
view an implied private of right action, which is a strict constructionist
test set forth in Alexander v. Sandoval.208 Under Sandoval, contextual
evidence of legislative intent is only relevant insofar as it clarifies the
meaning of the text.209 The Ellington court did not acknowledge the
plain meaning of the text. Further, it did not cite any specific legisla-
tive intent in its analysis. Rather, the court utilized judicial activism to
read an implied private of action existed in the statute in order to rein-
force its view that there should be no time restriction in the statute.
A court has correctly held that the DFA whistleblower does not
apply retroactively.210 In Ahmad v. Morgan Stanley & Co., the court
held: Plaintiff “has not shown, or even purported to show, clear evi-
dence of congressional intent that would rebut the presumption, § 78u-
6(h) cannot apply retroactively. Plaintiff-Ahmad cannot, therefore,
bring suit under § 78u-6(h) for conduct that occurred before Dodd-
Frank’s effective date, July 22, 2010.”211 Karl Llewellyn authored an
article that identified the apparent conflict between the canon that “[a]
statute imposing a new penalty or forfeiture, or a new liability or disa-
bility, or creating a new right of action will not be construed as having
a retroactive effect.”212 Nowhere in the SEC or DFA whistleblower
anti-retaliation remedies does it state that the statute should be ap-
plied retroactively.
The Supreme Court has demarcated that public policy argu-
ments are to be interpreted narrowly. In Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
MacLean, the Court ruled that if there is a public policy argument, it is
private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with
an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on discrimina-
tory conduct. . . .”).
206. See supra Part V.
207. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
208. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
209. Id. at 291-93.
210. Ahmad v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2 F. Supp. 3d 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
211. Id.
212. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 402 (1950).
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a matter for Congress or the President.213 In MacLean, the Court fur-
ther clarified that broadly interpreting the law would allow agencies to
promulgate blanket whistleblower rules and regulations, which frus-
trates the purpose of whistleblower statutes.214 Lower courts that are
interpreting the whistleblower laws broadly are not considering the
Supreme Court’s point. For example, courts that allow persons who are
no longer employees to be considered whistleblowers do not consider
plausible scenarios. As occurred in both Neo@Ogilvy and Ellington, the
plaintiffs made the report after they were terminated, and were thus
outside the scope of the definition of a whistleblower.215 Neither court
stated how long after an employee is terminated are they allowed to be
considered whistleblowers. If an employee is terminated, these broad
interpretations allow for plaintiffs to bring forth a claim four weeks, six
months, or ten years later.
Moreover, the Neo@Ogilvy and Ellington rulings that allow ex-
employees to bring forth a claim open the door for persons who were
never employees to bring forth claims. Another plausible situation
could be that Employee A learns of wrongdoing. Instead of reporting
the wrongdoing, Employee A leverages it for capital from Supervisor B
to be quiet about it. Supervisor B later leaves for another position at a
different company and hires Employee A at the new company. Before
Supervisor B leaves, Employee A sends an email to Supervisor B about
the suspicious activity. Employee A then reports the wrongdoing and
brings forth a claim under the DFA. Employee A would be unjustly
enriched, as he profited off illicit activity and only decided to exploit
the law in order to further his economic gain. Courts that employ a
broad interpretation of the retaliation remedies available to whistle-
blowers in the DFA are painting their public policies with too broad a
brush. Whistleblower statutes that are interpreted broadly are vulner-
able to exploitation, and thus defeat the purpose of the law.
VI. INTERPRETATION OF SIMILAR STATUTES
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Unlike other courts, The Ninth Circuit did not go beyond the
plain language of the SOX act in regard to whistleblower remedies
213. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 923-24 (2015).
214. Id.
215. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2015), abrogated by
Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F.
Supp. 2d 42, 46 (D. Mass. 2013).
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when interpreting its meaning  in Tides v. Boeing Co.216 There, Mat-
thew Neumann and Nicholas Tides, two members of the company’s
SOX audit group, alleged that they were pressured by supervisors to
provide reports giving favorable reviews to internal controls despite
their concerns that the controls were vulnerable to manipulation by
unauthorized users.217 Notwithstanding a published company policy
prohibiting employees from speaking to the press, both employees pro-
vided information about what occurred to a newspaper reporter who
incorporated the information in a published article.218 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiffs could not avail themselves to retaliation
remedies in the SOX because “[l]eaks to the media are not pro-
tected.”219 The court articulated that SOX applied only to “employees
of publicly-traded companies who disclose certain types of information
only to the three categories of recipients specifically enumerated in the
Act—federal regulatory and law enforcement agencies, Congress, and
employee supervisors.”220 The Tides court read the three categories of
the SOX statute according to their plain meaning. Courts interpreting
the DFA should likewise interpret the three categories221 according to
the plain meaning statutory meaning.
The DFA and SOX are the two federal statutes that provide
whistleblower protections for employees whose functions are business,
economics, or finance. While SOX does allow for whistleblowers to
make internal reports, the DFA does not contain such language.222 The
DFA has one category of recipient specifically enumerated—the
SEC.223 When a court reads a statute beyond its plain meaning, it is
effectively making law.
B. Whistleblower Protection Act
In MacLean,224 the Supreme Court relied primarily on statu-
tory construction when determining the scope of protections afforded to
federal employees under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).225
216. Tides v. Boeing Co., 644 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2011).
217. Id. at 811.
218. Id. at 811-12.
219. Id. at 811.
220. Id. at 810-11.
221. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (West, effective July 22, 2010).
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015).
225. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, P.L. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989); Act of Oct.
29, 1994, P.L. 103-424, 108 Stat. 4361 (1994); Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of
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The WPA provides protections to federal employees who make disclo-
sures if it is a “personnel action” that was taken because of a protected
disclosure made by a “covered employee.”226 The WPA provides an ex-
ception that states protections are not afforded from a personnel action
if the information disclosed is “specifically prohibited by law.”227 In
MacLean, the primary issue presented to the Court was whether the
WPA definition of “law” should be construed narrowly or broadly.228
The majority opinion229 cited the casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est canon, which holds that what a text does not provide is
unprovided, thus narrowly construing the statute.230 The dissenting
opinion preferred a broader interpretation to extend the powers beyond
that which is in the text of the statute.231 The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) promulgated rules that placed limitations on
disclosing “sensitive security information.”232 In Maclean, a federal air
marshal publicly disclosed that the TSA decided to cut costs by scaling
back the number of federal air marshals on long-distance flights.233
The federal air marshal revealed this to a reporter who subsequently
published a story about it.234
Basing its decision on the text of the statute, the Court held
that the numerous references to “law, rule, or regulation” in § 2302
manifest that a reference only to “law” should be interpreted to exclude
“rule” or “regulation.”235 Further, the Court elucidated that the Con-
gress frequently mentions the phrase “law, rule, or regulation”
throughout the statute.236 The text at issue refers only to “law” and the
Court adduced a fundamental concept of statutory interpretation,
which is that when the Congress includes certain language in one part
2012, P.L. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465 (codified, as amended, in various sections of Title 5
U.S.C. (2012)).
226. 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2017).
227. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
228. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 916.
229. Id. at 919 (“The interpretive canon that Congress acts intentionally when it omits
language included elsewhere applies with particular force here. . . .”).
230. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 533-34 (1947).
231. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 926 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Congress has required
agency action that would preclude the release of information “detrimental to the security of
transportation.” In so doing, Congress has expressed its clear intent to prohibit such disclo-
sures. I would respect its intent, and hold that a disclosure contravening that mandate is
“prohibited by law” within the meaning of the WPA.”).
232. Id. at 916.
233. Id. at 917.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 919.
236. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 919.
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of a statute but excludes it from another part of the statute, it is inten-
tional.237 Thus, the Court concluded that since § 2302(b)(8)(A) only
included “law” and the rest of the statute included “law, rule, or regula-
tion,” the Congress intended statutes, not rules or regulations, to
define exceptions to whistleblower protections.238 The Court did not go
beyond the plain meaning of the statute.
VII. REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM
The Second Circuit239 relied on a reductio ad absurdum argu-
ment, which was roundly rejected by the Ninth Circuit240 (although
nonetheless adopting a broad interpretation of the DFA anti-whistle-
blower statute) and the Supreme Court.241 While advocating for
Respondent-Somers, the Solicitor General acknowledged that requir-
ing whistleblowers to make disclosures only to the SEC would not yield
absurd results.242
Ironically, the Second Circuit and Respondent-Somers broadly
interpreted the DFA anti-whistleblower statute with a narrow point of
view. The aforementioned do not account for plausible scenarios that
would undermine their position and their interpretation. For example,
Employee A and Supervisor B concoct a scheme to unjustly enrich
themselves. Employee A and Supervisor B are aware that the Chief
237. Id. at 919.
238. Id. at 919-20.
239. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The statutory
interpretation issue posed by this case is not as stark, and hence not as easily resolved, as
that encountered in somewhat similar cases. . . . In Church of the Holy Trinity . . . applica-
tion of the express terms of a statute to the facts of a case yielded a result so unlikely to have
been intended by Congress that the Supreme Court did not apply those terms.) (emphasis
added) (internal citation omitted).
240. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017). (“As the Second
Circuit pointed out, subdivision (iii) would be narrowed to the point of absurdity; the only
class of employees protected would be those who had reported possible securities violations
both internally and to the SEC, when the employer—unaware of the report to the SEC—
fires the employee solely on the basis of the employee’s internal report. . . . This reading is
illogical.”) (emphasis added).
241. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 138 S.Ct. 767, 777 (2018) (“Our charge in this re-
view proceeding is to determine the meaning of “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h), Dodd-Frank’s
anti-retaliation provision. The definition section of the statute supplies an unequivocal an-
swer: A ‘whistleblower’ is ‘any individual who provides . . . information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission.’ . . .Leaving no doubt as to the definition’s
reach, the statute instructs that the ‘definitio[n] shall apply’ ‘[i]n this section,’ that is,
throughout §78u–6. §78u–6(a)(6).”).
242. Id. at 14 n. 6 (“The Solicitor General, unlike Somers, acknowledges that it would
not be absurd to apply the “whistleblower” definition to the antiretaliation provision. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 52.”).
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Financial Officer is defrauding the company. Employee A sends an
email to Supervisor B. Employee A and Employee B both short the
company stock. When the fraud comes to light, Employee A touts the
notification he sent to Supervisor B and collects the bounty, which he
then splits with Supervisor B. Employee A and Supervisor B are both
unjustly enriched as they shorted company stock, knowing what was
happening, in addition to collecting a reward after not notifying the
SEC. If Employee A and Supervisor B had both notified the SEC, they
would not have had as much time to short the company’s stock. The
reason is because if the shorting occurs too close in time to the fraud
being uncovered, Employee A and Supervisor B would draw attention
as possibly committing insider trading. Additionally, if Employee A
and Supervisor B notified the SEC, and the news became public, the
stock would most likely have dropped and they would not be able to
profit by shorting the stock. It is supercilious to think that Congress
did not think of plausible scenarios when it decided not to expand the
statute. Statutory interpretation is a “holistic” essay.243 If a judge
wants to assert their policy views, it should be within the confines of a
canon of construction.
Congress had its reasons in not expanding this provision and
requiring reporting to the SEC. In another example, Employee A and
Employee B both work for the same company. Employee A uncovers
wrongdoing and speaks with his colleague, Employee B. Employee B
advises Employee A to alert the SEC, but to not make an internal noti-
fication. Employee B surreptitiously alerts a supervisor. When an
investigation comes about, both Employee A and Employee B would be
allowed to claim a bounty according to a broad interpretation even
though Employee A is the one who followed the proper procedures and
protocols. By not following the rules, Employee B would be allowed to
game the system and become unjustly enriched. If Employee B were to
alert the SEC, the SEC would be able to investigate and see how Em-
ployee A uncovered the information legitimately and most likely
prevent Employee B from collecting a bounty since Employee B is
merely acting as a free-rider.
The dissenting opinion in Berman astutely points out that
“there is nothing absurd about a plain reading of the whistleblower def-
inition in Dodd-Frank.”244 The Fifth Circuit provides a great
illustration as to why the statute should be interpreted to its plain lan-
guage meaning:
243. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 234 (1993); United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
244. Berman, 801 F.3d at 158 n. 1 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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An example illustrates the effect of this third category of protected
activity for whistleblowers:
Assume a mid-level manager discovers a securities law violation.
On the day he makes this discovery, he immediately reports this
securities law violation (1) to his company’s chief executive officer
(“CEO”) and (2) to the SEC. Unfortunately for the mid-level man-
ager, the CEO, who is not yet aware of the disclosure to the SEC,
immediately fires the mid-level manager. The mid-level manager,
clearly a “whistleblower” as defined in Dodd-Frank because he pro-
vided information to the SEC relating to a securities law violation,
would be unable to prove that he was retaliated against because of
the report to the SEC. Accordingly, the first and second category of
protected activity would not shield this whistleblower from retalia-
tion. The third category of protected activity, however, protects the
mid-level manager. In this scenario, the internal disclosure to the
CEO, a person with supervisory authority over the mid-level man-
ager, is protected under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, the anti-retaliation
provision enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the
SOX anti-retaliation provision”). Accordingly, even though the CEO
was not aware of the report to the SEC at the time he terminated
the mid-level manager, the mid-level manager can state a claim
under the Dodd-Frank whistleblower-protection provision because
he was a “whistleblower” and suffered retaliation based on his dis-
closure to the CEO, which was protected under SOX.
As this example demonstrates, under the plain text of Dodd-Frank,
the third category of protected activity is not superfluous. It pro-
tects those individuals who qualify as whistleblowers from
retaliation on the basis of other required or protected disclosures.
Accordingly, we decline to adopt Asadi’s construction of the whistle-
blower-protection provision on the basis that § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) is
superfluous.245
In oral argument Chief Justice Roberts stated that there must
be an “absurd or anomalous” result for the Court to disregard a statu-
tory definition.246 The other Justices then discussed the bar that is
required for an absurd result. Justice Alito asked Respondent-Somers
if “the definition in the statute doesn’t apply if it produces an anomaly.
Is that the standard? That’s all you need to get out of the definitional
provision?”247 Justice Kagan clarified that in order to make a success-
ful reductio ad absurdum argument, an anomaly must be severe in
245. Asadi v. G.E. Energy U.S., L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627-28 (5th Cir. 2013).
246. Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 52 (“I mean, if you get to a tiny little thing and
you’re saying, well, the definition doesn’t work there, it’s one thing to say, well, then we’re
not going to apply it to that provision. The cases where you’re allowed to move beyond the
defined term are when if you stick to it, it really makes a mess of the whole thing.”).
247. Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 50-51.
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\13-1\FAM101.txt unknown Seq: 42  7-AUG-19 14:34
42 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 13:1:1
order to overcome a statutory definition.248 The Second Circuit and Re-
spondent-Somers did not clearly articulate how there is an absurd
result of narrowly interpreting the DFA anti-whistleblower retaliation
statute.249 This ruling reinforces the Court’s preference for plain mean-
ing interpretations.
CONCLUSION
Not one court that broadly interpreted the DFA whistleblower
statute retaliation remedy cited a canon of construction for their public
policy reasoning. These courts cite congressional intent, yet nowhere in
the legislative intent is the term “whistleblower” discussed. In Harris
v. Commissioner, Judge Learned Hand perspicaciously averred, “[i]t is
always a dangerous business to fill in the text of a statute from its
purposes. . . .”250 When courts rely on nontextualism, interpretations
are much more susceptible to manipulation as courts are enabled to
foist their own subjective views on the law.251
The presumption of consistent usage holds that a word has the
same meaning in different parts of an act.252 The word “whistleblower”
is statutorily defined and used twice in the DFA whistleblower statute.
The courts interpreting the statute broadly allege that the context of
the statute is ambiguous because it conflicts with congressional intent.
This is circular reasoning. The context of a statute is ambiguous if
there are multiple plausible interpretations of the text. It has not been
248. Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 48-49 (“But there you are, you have this defini-
tional provision, and it says what it says. And it says that it applies to this section. And you
have to have a really, really severe anomaly to get over that. So what makes it rise to that
level?”); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct. 1431, 1446
n.13 (2010) (“The possible existence of a few outlier instances does not prove [that an] inter-
pretation is absurd. Congress may well have accepted such anomalies as the price of a
uniformed system of federal procedure.”); Max Birmingham, Strictly for the Birds: The
Scope of Strict Liability Under the Migratory Bird Act, 13 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 1,
14-15 (2017) (discussing how Fifth Circuit’s ill-founded use of a reductio ad absurdum argu-
ment in regard to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
249. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 138 S.Ct. 767, 779 (2018) (“The plain-text reading of
the statute undoubtedly shields fewer individuals from retaliation than the alternative prof-
fered by Somers and the Solicitor General. But we do not agree that this consequence
‘vitiate[s]’ clause (iii)’s protection . . . or ranks as ‘absur[d]. . . .’ ”).
250. Harris v. Comm’r, 178 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1949), rev’d, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
251. Robert H. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the
Court Says, 34 A.B.A. J. 535, 537-38 (1948) (“I, like other opinion writers, have resorted not
infrequently to legislative history as a guide to the meaning of statutes. I am coming to
think it is a badly overdone practice, of dubious help to true interpretation and one which
poses serious problems for large part of the legal profession.”).
252. See HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 443 (Joseph Gerald Pease &
Herbert Chitty eds., 8th ed. 1911).
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previously determined that a statute is ambiguous if it does not reflect
legislative intent. These courts are exerting judicial activism by impos-
ing their personal views on how the statute should be written, instead
of how the statute is actually written.
The Second Circuit has held that “ ‘judicial activism’ is better
answered in the pages of a law review than in the context of a judicial
opinion.”253 The assertion of the Second Circuit is affirmed: The pages
of a law review are the best place for a judicial activism colloquy.
253. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 169 (2nd Cir. 1978).
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